Dismantling the "Jungle": Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France

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Abstract

Large migrant inflows have spurred anti-immigrant sentiment, but can small inflows have a different impact? We exploit the redistribution of migrants after the dismantling of the "Calais Jungle" in France to study the impact of the exposure to few migrants. Using instrumental variables, we find that in the presence of a migrant center (CAO), the growth rate of vote shares for the main far-right party (Front National (FN), our proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment) between 2012 and 2017 is reduced by about 11.9 percentage points. These effects, which crucially depends on the inflow's size, point towards the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954).

Keywords: Political Economy; Voting; Migration; EU; France; Migrants

JEL Classifications: C36, D72, J15, P16, R23

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1 Introduction and Background

In recent years, the number of asylum applications in the European Union increased from 431 thousand in 2013 to 627 thousand in 2014 and approximately 1.3 million in 2015 (Eurostat 2016). Given the high numbers of migrants reaching Europe and the future increased immigration projections both across and within countries, anticipating how natives respond when interacting with immigrants is crucial. Migrants will influence the labor force's composition, interact with natives in many commercial transactions, and influence politics both on the supply and demand side.

The considerable rise in the number of asylum applications and the difficulties experienced by European countries in redistributing asylum seekers across countries have drawn media, politicians, and scholars' attention. However, the existing literature has provided contradictory evidence, as some studies show that immigration increases the support for far-right parties (Barone et al. 2016; Brunner and Kuhn 2018; Edo et al. 2019; Halla et al. 2017; Harmon 2017; Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Otto and Steinhardt 2014; Viskanic 2017), while others find opposite results (Gamalerio et al. 2020; Lonsky 2020). Specifically for refugee and asylum seekers, Hangartner et al. (2019) and Dinas et al. (2019) show that exposure to migrants on the Greek islands, but no contact with them, increases hostility of natives towards them and voting for the extreme right-wing party "Golden Dawn". In contrast, Steinmayr (2020) shows that the interaction between migrants and natives in Upper-Austria has led to a decrease in votes for the Extreme Right. Additionally, Dustmann et al. (2019) show that the effects of refugee relocation on voting behavior in Denmark differ across rural and urban areas.

This evidence calls for further research on the mechanisms behind these results. Specifically, what is missing in the existing literature is an analysis of the potential role of the immigration inflows' size. It is poorly understood if *small* immigration inflows shape the anti-immigrant sentiment of natives differently than large inflows. This difference is particularly salient in the setting of asylum seekers' migration. This knowledge gap makes it more challenging to develop efficient relocation schemes for refugees across and

within countries. Many national and local governments refuse to host refugees and asylum seekers as they fear a rise in anti-immigrant resentment in places supposed to host the migrants. Hence, understanding whether the effect of refugee migration inflows changes with their size can inform policymakers.

A few reasons can explain this knowledge gap. First, it is challenging to separate the direct effect on voting behavior from the indirect effect through mediating variables. In many of the studies above, the effects are likely to be *indirect*. Large migration waves are likely to affect different intermediate variables, such as amenities, public spending, the labor market, or the local economy, which in turn affect voting. Therefore, identifying the direct effects is empirically challenging, as it requires settings in which indirect effects are negligible. Second, collecting information on the size and duration of exposure to migrants is a hard task that may require many hours of work. Third, migration inflows are not random, as many economic factors can affect locational choices (Ravenstein 1885. Hence, one needs a source of exogenous variation in the migrants' final location. The same requirement applies to the case of asylum seekers (Hangartner et al. 2019; Neumayer 2005).

Our setting enables us to deal with these challenges. We focus on the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle", an encampment in the North of France. In October 2016, this illegal camp reached 6,400 inhabitants (Le Monde 2016), shortly before the government closed it and relocated the migrants in other areas of the country. Between October 2015 and 2016, the government relocated the migrants to more than 300 migrant centers called *Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAOs)*.

This setting presents important advantages that we exploit in the analysis below. First, it is unlikely that the relocation affected the local economy. CAOs hosted the migrants for a short period (typically less than three months), during which they did not have the right to work. Besides, the central government paid the cost of the relocation. These conditions enable us to study the effect of direct contact between migrants and natives while excluding potential indirect effects. Consistent with this claim, in the analysis below, we show that migrants' did not affect the local economic activity. Second, we collected information about CAOs' location through a systematic analysis of local newspapers

(Factiva) and combined them with a dataset that was publicly released by CIMADE (the main association helping migrants) on October 24^{th} 2016. We also collected precise information on CAOs' size. Among the 361 municipalities that hosted a CAO, we find that, on average, these centers could host 31 migrants at the same time, which means 18 migrants per 1000 inhabitants.

Third, this framework enables us to link municipality level variation in exposure to migrants to electoral outcomes. Specifically, we exploit the fact that the 2017 French presidential election was held after the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle". We use the change in the FN municipal-level vote shares between the 2012 and the 2017 presidential elections as the main outcome in our analysis and as a proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment. During the campaign, the rhetoric of the FN was anti-immigrant, referring continuously to the migrant crisis. The FN diffused this anti-immigrant stance through general and social media, public gatherings, and the party's election manifesto.[1]

Finally, this setting allows us to deal with the potential endogeneity of CAOs' location. Indeed, the French government could have chosen the location of CAO centers exploiting information unobservable to us. In case the municipalities chosen were on different trends in terms of FN voting, then we could not identify the causal impact of CAOs. To deal with this challenge, we rely on an instrumental variable (IV) approach, and we instrument the location of a CAO in a specific town with the presence of a "Holiday Village" ("Village Vacances" in French) in the same municipality.[2] We expect a positive correlation between the presence of a CAO and a holiday village because one of the criteria used for choosing CAOs' location was potential additional space in those holiday villages. Specifically, given that the "Jungle" was shut down mostly in October 2016, the holiday villages would be unoccupied at that time and could thus be used as temporary shelters for migrants. Besides, holiday villages were built mainly in the 1970s, much before the current migrant

[1] See La Croix (2017), BBC (2017), and Le Monde (2017a) amongst others.

[2] "Holiday Villages" are structures owned by a public company managed by the state to be used by their employees to go on holiday. Since those structures were mostly empty during the dismantling, the central government used them to host migrants. In some cases, these structures were not used, but they were still kept as an alternative solution if collective houses or other empty flats did not prove sufficient. Our analysis controls for these variables and a proxy for the overall level of tourism at the municipal level.

surge that led to the creation of the CAOs, and certainly not to host migrants. Thus, the exclusion restriction is likely warranted. In addition, our regressions take into account many potential covariates (explained below) that control for municipal sociodemographic characteristics.

Our main results show that the growth in FN's vote shares between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections was 11.9 percentage points lower in municipalities that hosted a CAO (11.7 in our reduced-form estimates). As the average increase of FN's votes over this period corresponded to about 20%, this indicates that the increase in FN vote shares was 40% lower in municipalities with a CAO. Our interpretation of these findings is that citizens developed greater acceptance towards migrants. The fact that we observe an increase in the vote shares received by the far-left party *Front de Gauche*, which had a more open stance towards migrants, but a similar political platform to the FN on other issues, further confirms our interpretation of the results. We find spillover to neighboring municipalities. Municipalities within a five km radius had a lower growth rate of vote share for the FN by about 1.6 percentage points. Importantly, our analysis shows that the negative effect disappears and eventually becomes positive above a certain number of migrants hosted. Our calculations suggest that the impact on FN's vote shares becomes positive in municipalities that, on average, hosted more than 32 migrants per 1000 inhabitants. This finding is consistent with the evidence that large inflows contributed to the rise of right-wing parties in many western countries.[3]

Our paper provides three main contributions. First, the event study analyzed led to proper direct contact between natives and migrants, not to a short and transient exposure. Since migrants were not allowed to work, and the government covered the costs, our setting allows us to estimate the effect of direct contact while ruling out potential indirect impacts. As will be outlined in the next sections, we believe this setting meets some of the conditions described by contact theory (Allport 1954), such as authorities' role in supporting the contact between natives and immigrants. Therefore we expect a decrease

[3]We also find a stronger decrease in municipalities with larger shares of young people. The effect is also stronger in towns that are distant to migrants' entry points such as *Vallée de la Roya* (Ventimiglia), at the border between France and Italy (consistent with findings by Hangartner et al. (2019), Dinas et al. (2019), Steinmayr (2020)).

in anti-immigrant sentiments.

Second, our analysis reveals that the negative effect turns positive in municipalities that hosted many migrants. This evidence suggests that natives may perceive the inflow of new immigrants as a threat for their social, cultural, and economic hegemony when the number of migrants received overcomes a certain threshold. As suggested by "realistic group conflict theories" (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo 1983; Campbell 1965; Lahav 2004; Quillian 1995; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Taylor 1998), this perceived threat can potentially determine a rise in prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment. However, given that migrants could not work and that we can exclude any effect on the local economy, we do not think that the perceived threat generated by big CAOs should be due to economic concerns related to the potential competition in the labor market (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In the context studied, it is more likely that natives perceive the opening of too big CAOs as a threat to their identity and cultural dominance (Golder 2003). This intuition is consistent with the evidence that large shares of immigrants hosted may lead to more residential segregation (Card et al. 2008), making it more complicated to foster direct contact between natives and immigrants. Third, the evidence provided in this paper has a clear and direct policy implication. It suggests that governments should develop a more proportional relocation mechanism (Bansak et al. 2017), redistributing refugees in a more homogeneous and diffuse way.

The next section describes the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the institutional framework and data. Section 4 presents the empirical specification. Section 5 presents the results of the paper. Section 6 concludes. Finally, Section A1 in the online Appendix describes the falsification and robustness checks.

2 Conceptual framework

In this section, we summarize the main theories that drive our empirical analysis on the effect of the contact between immigrants and natives. We provide a brief description of the predictions that originate from these theories and how they apply to our context. For

more detailed reviews on these theories, excellent references are the works of Paluck and Green (2009), Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), Hangartner et al. (2019), and Dustmann et al. (2019).

We refer to two main theories. The first is contact theory (Allport 1954), which describes how the direct contact between immigrants and natives can reduce anti-immigrant sentiments when the following four conditions are met: equal status between the two groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of authorities. However, as suggested by the literature (Hangartner et al. 2019), it is difficult to find natural experiments and event studies in which all these conditions are simultaneously met. Besides, the literature has shown how direct contact can potentially reduce prejudice, even when only a subset of these conditions is met (Paluck et al. 2019; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Specifically, some scholars have suggested and provided evidence that contact between migrants and natives can increase knowledge about the outgroup, leading potentially to a reduction in prejudice (Barlow et al. 2012; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008).

The second stream of theories is the one that Campbell (1965) labeled "realistic group conflict theories" (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo 1983; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). According to this theoretical framework, natives can potentially perceive the inflow of a sufficiently big group of immigrants as a threat to their social, cultural, and economic dominance. This threat can then lead to an increase in prejudice against the outside group and a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment. Consistent with these intuitions, Taylor (1998) suggests that an increase in the outside group's size can lead to a rise in prejudice. Besides, Quillian (1995) and Lahav (2004) indicate that the largest is the size of the outside group, the highest is the threat perceived by the members of the dominant group.

Which predictions can we generate from these theories that can guide the empirical analysis in the context of the Calais "Jungle" dismantling? According to the original formulation of the contact theory (Allport 1954), the contact between natives and immigrants should lead to a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes when the four conditions described above apply. However, more recent investigations of the theory suggest that a subset of these conditions can lead to a reduction in anti-immigrant attitudes (Paluck

et al. 2019; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). In our setting, national and local governments had an essential role in managing the dismantling and the relocation of migrants. Hence, given the involvement of national and local authorities in supporting the contact between natives and immigrants, we can expect the opening of CAO centers to reduce the FN's vote shares. Besides, the small size of the immigration inflows generated on average by the opening of CAO centers may have reduced the possibility of segregation of the migrants (Card et al. 2008), potentially increasing the likelihood of contact and intergroup cooperation. Finally, the contact between natives and a small group of migrants should have increased the knowledge about the outside group, potentially generating a reduction in prejudice (Barlow et al. 2012; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Thus, based on the general features of the event studied in this paper, we can expect, the effect on the FN's vote shares to be negative.

On the other hand, we know that CAOs centers' size was heterogeneous across municipalities, with some receiving more migrants than others. Hence, following the intuitions of the "realistic group conflict theories" (Campbell 1965), we can expect the baseline effect of the opening of CAOs centers on FN's vote shares to be heterogeneous across size. Specifically, we can expect this effect to become smaller in magnitude and eventually become positive when the centers' size becomes sufficiently big. In conclusion, given the theoretical intuitions provided by both the contact theory and the "realistic group conflict theories", we can expect the effect of the CAO centers on FN's vote shares to change with the inflow size.

3 Institutional Framework and Data

3.1 Migrants and the Calais "Jungle"

The Calais "Jungle" was a migrant camp, which first took form in the late 1990s and grew following the European migrant crisis in 2014-2015, reaching a peak of more than 7,000 inhabitants in 2015 (Figure 1).

Therefore, the government decided to dismantle the camp progressively starting from

October 2015 by creating CAOs. These centers aim at receiving migrants who have not yet started procedures to obtain refugee status. Migrants are meant to stay in CAOs only for a short period, usually less than three months. They receive bed and board but no separate financial assistance. The average cost to the government is 25 Euros a day (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2017). Migrants who have started a procedure to obtain refugee status are redirected to the CADA (*Centres d'Accueil pour Demandeurs d'Asile*) while awaiting a decision. Between 2015 and 2017, the CADA places increased to 40,000 places (La Cimade 2017). Other structures were also created over time, such as the AT-SA (*Accueil Temporaire du Service de l'Asile* - 6,000 places), the HUDA (*Hebergement d'Urgence des Demandeurs d'Asile* - 15,000 places), the CPH (*Centre Provisoire d'Hebergement* - 2,300 places), and PRAHDA (*Programme d'Accueil et d'Hebergement des Demandeurs d'Asile* - 5,351 places) (La Cimade 2017).

Figure 1: Evolution of the number of migrants in the Calais camp



The dismantling occurred between October 2015 and October 2016. The government reported having relocated 13,366 migrants of those more than 7,000 inhabitants in October 2016. This event received considerable media attention (Figure 2, shows mentions for

"Jungle de Calais").

Figure 2: Google Trends for the expession "Jungle de Calais"



To the best of our knowledge, the French government did not provide official information on the location of the CAOs. The total number of CAOs is also uncertain, with different government sources citing different numbers (more details on request). To circumvent this issue, we combine the manual collection of information with a public database released by *CIMADE* in October 2016. Using Factiva, we systematically searched for articles mentioning the terms "CAO" for each French *département*. When available, we recorded the number of migrants. This procedure enabled us to recover 291 CAOs. We combined this information with a dataset provided by CIMADE, listing 210 centers and their capacity. The union of these two datasets results in 361 centers, close to the government's number in January 2017, namely 365 (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2017). Therefore, there should be only a few CAOs missing, if at all. Hence, since we are probably assigning some treated municipalities into the control group, we would slightly underestimate our treatment effect.

We also create a measure of CAO capacity through the following procedure. For CAOs recorded only in our manually collected dataset, we define a CAO's capacity as the maximum number of migrants ever recorded among all articles mentioning it. For CAOs belonging only to the CIMADE dataset or our manually collected dataset and the CIMADE dataset, the capacity is measured using the number of beds in the CIMADE

dataset.[4] This measure of capacity cannot give information about the *total* number of migrants or the length of their stay. However, it informs about the *maximum* number of migrants that could be hosted at any point in time.

The second challenge is that the criteria of allocation of the CAOs have not been clearly defined, making the use of an instrument mandatory. Even though the government announced that the allocation of CAOs across regions would be based on "socio-demographic criteria" (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2017), no comprehensive list of factors was provided, except for the fact that the Parisian agglomeration and Corsica would be excluded.

Finally, the last issue to consider is the extent to which the mayors were involved in the allocation process. Although many mayors were contacted to receive migrants (Association des Maires de France 2016; Le Monde 2015), during the final dismantling, the Minister of Interior, entrusted the final decision to the local representatives of the government i.e. the *préfets*.[5] The *préfets* would first identify suitable premises without prior consultation and then negotiate with the mayors. Even though mayors' compliance is not generally observed, we exploit additional information about a list of mayors who publicly declared their willingness to welcome migrants.

3.2 French Presidential Elections

French presidential elections are held every five years since 2002, using a two-round majoritarian system. If no candidate received more than 50% of the expressed votes, a second-round is held between the two candidates with the largest shares.

Our main outcome of interest is the share of votes received by the FN candidates in the first round of the presidential election. Figure 3 shows the geographic repartition of FN voters between 2012 and 2017. The FN's strongholds are the south-eastern and

[4]Reassuringly, even though our capacity measure is not defined in the same way, its internal consistency seems warranted. To check it, we compare, among CAOs observed in both datasets, the maximum number of sheltered migrants observed in our manually collected dataset and the capacity registered in the CIMADE dataset. Excluding outliers for which the difference between the two measures is more than two standard deviations away from the mean in absolute value, i.e., less than 10% of cases, the correlation between the two measures is 88%. Therefore, our capacity measure is likely to indicate the number of migrants that were actually sheltered in CAOs.

[5]The *préfets* have authority at the level of the *département*.

north-eastern parts of France. In those areas, more than 30% of the population voted for FN both in 2012 and 2017. One can also see that the FN vote increased substantially between 2012 and 2017 (by 20% on average).

Figure 3: FN vote shares in the first round of 2012 and 2017 presidential elections



(a) FN vote share - 2012

(b) FN vote share - 2017

3.3 Other Data Description

Presidential election results in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 at the municipality level come from the Ministry of Interior. The location and size of holiday villages are taken from the 2016 survey on tourism carried out by the French national statistical institute (INSEE). From the same source, we also collect the number of hotel beds per municipality. To proxy the compliance of French mayors in implementing the CAOs, we use a list of mayors who declared to be willing to welcome migrants. This dataset, taken from the National French Television (France Télévision 2015), is neither official nor exhaustive but contains 417 municipalities.

We collect municipalities' characteristics from the 2013 and 2006 French Census. We consider the total population, the share of vacant housing, homeowners, and social housing. We also collect the share of individuals aged between 15 and 29, 30 and 44, 45 and 59, 60 and 74, or over 75, respectively. We consider the share of individuals belonging to each of the eight official socio-professional categories (farmers, independent, white collars, intermediary professions, employees, blue collars, retired and inactive). Similarly,

we consider the share of unemployment among the population aged between 15 and 64. Finally, we also report migrants' share of the total population, where migrants are defined as foreign-born individuals. From the 2013 version of the INSEE file on disposable income, we also collect the median disposable income by consumption unit (available only for municipalities of more than 50 inhabitants). We use the variation over time and their stock in 2013 as controls in our regressions to capture municipalities' evolution after the 2008 financial crisis and current economic conditions. From the INSEE, we also collect information about each municipality type (central, suburban, independent, or rural).

To control for mayors' characteristics, we use the *Repertoire National des Elus*. This dataset provides information on the mayor's occupation, i.e., if she is a private employee or a civil servant, a teacher, a farmer, or an individual working in an industrial or liberal occupation. It also indicates the mayor's age and party affiliation, which we reclassify into five categories: left-wing, right-wing, extreme left, extreme right, or others.

From the *CIMADE*, we also collect information on the presence of other types of migrant centers, including CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH, and PRAHDA. The data is most detailed for the CADA, where we can obtain the number of places between 2012 and 2016 on a yearly basis. This allows us to compute the evolution of the number of places in the CADA at the municipality level during this period. Combining all this information with a GIS dataset of French municipalities (provided by the French National Geographic Institute (IGN)), we compute each municipality's distance to each of these centers. Furthermore, we also compute the distance to the closest CAO for each municipality.

We also use a dataset from Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi (2017), which reports job destructions and creations at the municipal level in France between January 2009 and June 2017. This dataset provides a measure of local employment dynamics at the municipal level with high frequency.

4 Empirical Specification and Instrumental Variable Approach

We estimate the effect of CAOs on the FN vote's evolution between 2012 and 2017 with the following equation:

$$\Delta FN \equiv log(FN_{2017})_i - log(FN_{2012})_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CAO_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where $log(FN_{2017})_i - log(FN_{2012})_i$ is the difference of log voting shares for the FN between 2017 and 2012 elections; CAO_i is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality i has a CAO, while X_i are control variables for municipality i, outlined in the data description above. Specifically, we use all the socio-economic controls and their evolutions, log distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution in the number of CADA places between 2012 and 2016, log hotel rooms, political and administrative characteristics, and mayors' demographics. The standard errors are clustered at the *département* level.

However, the assignment of the CAOs is not random. First, it is possible to show that municipalities that volunteered to receive migrants and those with historically lower FN votes were more likely to receive them. Since this measure is only an imperfect measure of compliance, and as we do not observe the bargaining process between municipalities and the government, simple OLS estimates are likely to be biased towards zero, given that citizens of volunteering cities are arguably more tolerant toward migrants and less likely to be affected by the presence of a CAO. Furthermore, many CAOs were established in vacant buildings owned or rented by the state, such as old military bases or hospitals. They were also more likely to be located in places with a higher number of vacant housing units in rural areas. Therefore, simple OLS estimations might capture part of these effects, which are likely to be factors increasing the share of votes in favor of the FN over time.

To circumvent these potential biases, we propose to instrument CAOs location with the presence of holiday villages, measured in 2016. Even though the government considered

several types of venues, a strong emphasis was put on holiday villages. We argue that, once we control for a proxy for overall tourism (i.e., the number of sleeping places in hotels), holiday villages provide a good instrument to achieve exogenous variation in migrants' assignment. Residency in those holiday villages is seasonal rather than permanent and is thus most likely not associated with any differential trends in a municipality's political characteristics. What reinforces this argument is that the holiday villages were established in the past and certainly not to host migrants. In fact, the stock of beds seems to be very stable over time. The correlation coefficient between the number of beds in 2014 and in 2016 is equal to 0.98. On the other hand, ancient military bases or hospitals and total vacant units might indicate a municipality's progressive isolation. Therefore, we think that holiday villages can capture exactly this exogenous variation in migrant allocation that we are looking for. Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the First Stage, where the red dots are the CAOs, and the black shadings are the number of beds in holiday villages. We are aware that, given the large number of municipalities in France, and given the heterogeneity across different areas of the country, the location of holiday villages was not chosen randomly in the past. Hence, we can expect municipalities with and without holiday villages to differ along with various observable socio-economic attributes and trends. In the analysis below, we take advantage of our detailed micro-data to show that, once we control for our proxy for overall tourism, controlling for these socio-economic attributes and trends does not affect the estimated coefficients.

To take into account the binary nature of our endogenous treatment variable, we run the instrumental variable analysis by following the methodology proposed by Wooldridge (2010).[6] This procedure follows three steps. First, we estimate the following binary response model (i.e., probit), in which we regress the dummy variable CAO_i on the instrument $Holiday\ village_i$ for the presence of a holiday village in the municipality and all the municipal characteristics captured by X_i:

$$Pr(CAO_i) = \Phi(Holiday\ village_i, X_i). \tag{2}$$

[6]See procedure 18.1 in Wooldridge (2010)

Figure 4: CAOs and density of holiday villages capacity



Second, we compute $Pr(\hat{CAO}_i)$, the predicted value of CAO_i taken from the probit model. Third, we run the 2SLS model, using $Pr(\hat{CAO}_i)$ as our instrument. Therefore, the 2SLS first stage regression is:

$$CAO_i = \beta_0^{'} + \beta_1^{'} Pr(\hat{CAO}_i) + \delta^{'} X_i + \epsilon_i^{'} \tag{3}$$

We run the 2SLS second stage regressing the outcome variable $log(FN_{2017})_i - log(FN_{2012})_i$ on X_i and the fitted values from the first stage regression.[7] As explained by Wooldridge (2010), this approach allows us to get consistent and efficient estimates of the main parameter of interest (i.e., β_1).[8]

[7] We estimate all this specification using the *ivtreatreg* routine in STATA (see Cerulli (2014)).

[8] We are aware that this procedure is less straightforward than a 2SLS model, in which a linear

To confirm the validity of this strategy, we run several falsification and robustness tests in Section A1 in the online Appendix. In particular, we show that municipalities with a CAO did not seem to be on different electoral pre-trends before the Calais camp's dismantling. Besides, controlling for past evolutions of the FN vote does not affect our results. Also, our results are unaffected when instrumenting with the number of beds in holiday villages in 2014. Finally, we run a falsification test using Corsica's particular case: while this region has several holiday villages, it did not receive any CAOs. Yet, we do not find that municipalities in Corsica with a holiday village had different voting trends for the FN between 2012 and 2017.

Finally, we investigate the presence of spillover effects by estimating the effect of distance to the closest CAO (using radiuses of 5km, 10km, and 15km). To estimate spillovers, we have to assume that the decision to create a CAO in a given municipality is unrelated to politics in localities in the radius of 5km, 10km, and 15km. This assumption seems warranted given the high number of observations and is re-enforced when looking at our empirical results: the estimate of β_1 is affected only slightly when spatial dummies are introduced.

5 Empirical Results

5.1 Baseline results

In Table 1, we observe a negative but not significant correlation between a CAO's presence and FN voting shares' evolution when looking at the OLS regression (Column 2).

probability model (LPM) is used in the first stage regression. We decided to adopt the procedure described by Wooldridge (2010) because of a few limitations encountered when running a conventional 2SLS. First, in this context, the probit model described in equation 2 does a better job in predicting the opening of CAOs compared to LPM. As a comparison, the R^2 of the probit model is 0.35, while the one of LPM is 0.10. Second, the LPM first stage is characterized by an F-statistic below 10 (i.e., 8.69), which suggests that, in this case, the conventional 2SLS may lead to biased estimates due to the presence of a weak instrument. On the opposite, with the three steps procedure described above, we get a stronger first-stage regression. Third, in the LPM first stage, we found that a large proportion (approximately 25 %) of the predicted values fall outside the range 0-1. As suggested by some scholars (Amick et al. 2020), this issue may lead to biased estimates. Despite these limitations, when running the 2SLS approach with a LPM first stage we get qualitatively similar results, even tough the coefficients are not precisely estimated (results can be made available upon request).

Moving to the instrumental variables approach, we get a strong first-stage regression with large F-statistics, which are above the customary values indicated by the weak instrument guidelines given in Stock and Yogo (2005). With the instrumental variables approach, the effect is more negative and highly significant. As we previously discussed, not instrumenting the allocation of CAOs biases our estimates towards zero. When we run the IV strategy controlling only for our proxy for overall tourism (i.e., the number of sleeping places in hotels), a CAO's presence decreases the growth rate of FN votes by 14.8 percentage points (Column (4)).

Table 1: Main Results on the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1) Pr(CAO)	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
Holiday village	0.464***					
	(0.099)					
CAO		-0.009		-0.148***	-0.119***	-0.128***
		(0.008)		(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Log hotel rooms				-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.004***
				(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pr(CAO)			-0.117***			
			(0.034)			
ring5_CAO						-0.016***
						(0.004)
ring10_CAO						-0.003
						(0.003)
ring15_CAO						-0.006
						(0.004)
Regression	Probit	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
F-Statistic	-	-	-	250.88	125.37	123.02
Observations	27922	27938	27920	27920	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2		0.073	0.073	0.001	0.069	0.069

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Column 1 is the probit first stage regression showing the coefficient of the presence of a holiday village on the CAO variable. Colomuns 2 and 3 report the coefficients of regressions run by OLS. Columns 4 to 6 are the second stage regressions run by instrumental variables controlling only for the log of the number of hotel rooms (column 4), instrumental variables adding the other control variables (column 5), and instrumental variables with different perimeter rings respectively (column 6). The rings denote municipalities within the 5, 10 and 15 km radius respectively. Control variables: municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

The coefficient does not change much when adding all the control variables described above (Column (5)). This result suggests that holiday villages represent a good instrument to achieve exogenous variation in migrants' assignment, once we rule out overall tourism. As we can see from Column 5, a CAO's presence decreases FN votes' growth rate by 11.9 percentage points. Our reduced form in Column 3 is very similar, as the Pr(CAO) coefficient is significant, with a magnitude equal to 11.7 percentage points. Since the FN vote increased by 20% on average in French municipalities between 2012 and 2017 (which corresponds to a 5.1 points increase on average), this estimation suggests that the growth rate of FN vote in municipalities with a CAO was only 40% the one of municipalities without a CAO (corresponding to an increase lower by about 3.9 points - which is what we find using shares as outcome variables rather than logs).

In all columns, we control the city's type, many locality level covariates (political, socio-economic), and the log of hotel beds in the municipality. Considering spillover effects, we can see that localities in a five km radius experience a negative impact on the FN vote, but not as strong as the municipalities that have a CAO (Column (5)).

In Table 2, we investigate what impact the relocation of migrants had on abstention and votes for the extreme left-wing party. We can see that a CAO location is associated with a slightly lower abstention (higher turnout). Controlling for the change in abstention, we can see that the electoral effects on the FN's vote are unaffected (Column (3)). When looking at the effect on extreme-left vote shares, we find an effect in favor of vote shares of the *Front de Gauche* (Column (5)).[9] Therefore, we can establish that the causal impact of migrant relocation has led to a decrease in votes for the FN and an increase in both turnout and votes in favor of the major left-wing pro-immigrant party.

5.2 Heterogeneous Effects of Migrant Relocation

We conduct regressions showing heterogeneous effects in Table 3. We interact with the treatment variable variables capturing socio-economic characteristics at the municipal

[9]We do not carry out a separate analysis for electoral outcomes for the center-left and center-right parties because the candidacy of Emmanuel Macron, an ex-socialist minister and centrist, makes it difficult to compare those votes with the election in 2012.

Table 2: Effect of migrant Relocation on Abstention and Extreme-left wing votes

	(1) Δ_{Abst}	(2) Δ_{Abst}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FG}	(5) Δ_{FG}
CAO	-0.008	-0.172***	-0.082**	0.012	0.189***
	(0.009)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.061)
Δ_{Abst}			-0.005		
			(0.007)		
Regression	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic	-	107.16	107.328	-	107.172
Observations	27926	27908	27906	27925	27907
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.013	0.063	0.019	0.015

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Column 1 reports the coefficients of an OLS regression where the variation of abstention rate between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 is regressed on the presence of a CAO. Column 2 reports the coefficient of CAO on the variation of abstention after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. Column 3 reports the second stage of the main instrumental variable specification, where the outcome variable is the variation of FN log vote shares between 2012 and 2017, but controlling for the variation in the abstention rate. Column 4 reports the CAO coefficient in an OLS regression where the outcome variable is the variation in log vote shares obtained by the *Front de Gauche* between 2012 and 2017. Column 5 reports the estimated effect of CAO on the variation of the Front de Gauche vote share after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

level. To instrument for these interaction terms, we interact the prediction from the first stage with the municipal socio-economic variables, following the procedure in Wooldridge (2010).[10]

As described in the introduction, the main focus is on the size of the immigration inflow generated by the opening of CAO centers (Column (1)). Interestingly, the FN's vote share's negative effect is reduced in places where more migrants were allocated. The analysis of the intensive margin yields important results for the understanding of electoral reaction to migrant inflows. We indeed find that FN's negative effect is stronger in municipalities with fewer migrants per inhabitant hosted in the CAOs. We estimate that municipalities that decreased their FN vote upon receiving migrants were those that, on average, hosted less than 32 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Above this threshold, which corresponds to about twice the average capacity per inhabitant of observed CAOs and is inferior to the average share of migrants in municipalities in the 2013 Census (39 per 1,000 inhabitants), CAO's estimated average effect on FN vote becomes positive. This result is in line with the literature on the impacts of immigrants' large inflows on political outcomes. This evidence indicates that, while small immigration inflows can reduce prejudice, inflows above a certain threshold can produce the opposite effect, suggesting a potential "Tipping point".

In Table 3, we also investigate the role of other socio-economic factors. We find a more substantial decrease in municipalities with a larger share of younger inhabitants (column 2). This result could be because younger people have less fortified opinions towards migrants and might be more willing to get in touch with the new people joining their municipality. In column 5, we also show that the decrease of votes for the FN is more pronounced in places that already have had a higher share of immigrants. This result suggests that pre-existing communities from the same country of origin as the migrants facilitate initial contact. Finally, we also find that effects on the FN vote are less strong in municipalities close to migrant routes such as the *Vallee de la Roya*.[11] The further away

[10] In this Table, all the interaction effects are expressed with respect to the mean value of the interacted variable, except for the capacity of the CAO per 1,000 inhabitants (which is compared to the minimum CAO capacity), and for voluntary mayors (which is a dummy variable).

[11] We measure the distance to this area which was an important entry point of migrants at the border

from this entry point, the stronger the decrease.

Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects of the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}	(7) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.108***	-0.060	-0.153***	-0.109	-0.070*	-0.123***	-0.223**
	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.085)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.110)
CAO $\times \frac{CAO-migrants}{Population} \times 1000$	0.004***						0.006**
	(0.001)						(0.002)
CAO $\times \frac{Young(15-29)}{Pop(over15)}$		-0.522**					-0.855**
		(0.223)					(0.406)
CAO $\times Voluntary - Mayors$			0.053				0.093
			(0.045)				(0.056)
CAO $\times log(Population)$				-0.002			0.051*
				(0.013)			(0.028)
CAO $\times \frac{Immigrants}{Population}$					-0.786*		-1.393**
					(0.444)		(0.541)
CAO$\times dist.Roya$						-0.034***	-0.027**
						(0.011)	(0.012)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27918	27918
Adjusted R^2	0.070	0.072	0.067	0.070	0.071	0.069	0.064

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All columns correspond to second stage IV regressions where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village, and where the outcome variable is the difference between log FN vote shares between 2012 and 2017. Interaction terms of the presence of a CAO and a covariate are instrumented with the interaction between the dummy for holiday village and the covariate following Wooldridge (2010). All interaction terms are expressed with respect to the mean value of the interacted variable - except for the number of places in CAO and voluntary mayors. The coefficient for the distance to the la Roya Valley is multiplied by 100 and thus expressed in units of 100 km. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

5.3 Contact theory vs. Realistic Group Conflict theories

We think that the negative baseline effect in Table 1 is in line with contact theory (Allport 1954), which suggests that the contact between natives and immigrants should lead to a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes when certain conditions apply.

The anecdotal evidence on the CAOs' experience seems to confirm this idea. When collecting our data on the location of the CAOs, we came across many examples that

between France and Italy through the distance of each municipality to Breil-sur-Roya

suggest that the interactions between migrants and local populations were generally successful. While at the onset of the dismantling process, protests seemed to be widespread (La Depeche 2016), and sometimes violent (La Croix 2016), several articles mention that local populations regret migrants have to leave after only a few months, even within municipalities where protests took place initially (Charente Libre 2018; Liberation 2017). Many forms of interactions emerged, through charity dinners (La Nouvelle Republique du Centre Ouest 2017), car-pooling (Liberation 2017), or football games. Officials of small municipalities argued that the arrival of migrants revitalized football teams in rural areas, which lacked players to compete in amateur leagues (20 Minutes 2016). Although we cannot systematically analyze those events, they do not seem rare and come up repeatedly in newspapers. A map released by Le Monde (2017b) shows that initiatives helping migrants being integrated were far from scarce.

Conversely, the results in Table 3 indicate that CAO centers' negative effect on FN votes shares can turn positive when the centers' size reaches a certain threshold. We believe that this evidence indicates that natives can perceive the inflow of new immigrants as a threat to their social, cultural, and economic hegemony when their number is too large. This evidence is consistent with the "realistic group conflict theories". For this event study, we think that the potential threat generated by large CAOs should be due to cultural rather than economic concerns. In Table 4, we use data from Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi (2017), which reports the number of job creations and destructions at the municipality level from January 2009 to June 2017, to test the potential economic consequences. As shown in Table 4, we do not find any significant relationship between the presence of a CAO and net job creation. Controlling for net job creation per inhabitant before and after the creation of a CAO does not affect our IV estimates. Therefore it is more likely that when entering in contact with a large group of outsiders, natives perceived the opening of big CAOs as a threat to their identity and cultural dominance.

Table 4: Effect of Migrant Relocation on Net job creation

	(1) $NJC_{Post-10/2015}$	(2) $NJC_{Post-10/2016}$	(3) $NJC_{Post-10/2015}$	(4) $NJC_{Post-10/2016}$	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
CAO	0.647	0.517	-4.785	-1.875	-0.080**	-0.080**
	(1.272)	(0.894)	(3.107)	(2.087)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Regression	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $NJC_{2012-2014}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $NJC_{Post-10/2015}$	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls: $NJC_{Post-10/2016}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-Statistic	-	-	107.764	107.764	106.973	107.038
Observations	27940	27940	27922	27922	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.016	0.023	0.015	0.063	0.063

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of an OLS regression where we regress the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitants after October 2015 (Column 1) and after October 2016 (Column 2) on the presence of a CAO. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients of the same specification where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village. Columns 5 is an instrumental variable regression where the outcome variable is the variation of log FN vote share between 2012 and 2017, where we control for the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitants after October 2015. Column 6 is the same specification as Column 5, but controlling for net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitant after October 2016. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses. NJC stands for Net Job Creation (per thousand inhabitants)

6 Conclusion

We have tried to answer important questions regarding the electoral impact of migrants' relocation after the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle". We find a negative effect on the FN's vote shares, consistent with the contact hypothesis. We provide some anecdotal evidence that supports this claim. We also provide empirical evidence on the heterogeneity behind the baseline effect. We show that the effect can potentially turn positive for municipalities that received a larger number of migrants, which is consistent with "realistic group conflict theories". Given that CAO centers did not have any local economic impact, we think that large reception centers' positive effect on FN votes shares is likely due to cultural and identitarian rather than economic concerns. In conclusion, this paper gives some indication also on the allocation mechanisms of migrants. Small numbers seem to decrease prejudice against them. Overall, our results suggest that there is a difference in perceived immigration through the media compared to real immigration. The electoral reaction to actual migration seems to depend crucially on the size of the inflow.

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A1 Appendix [For Online Publication]: falsification and robustness checks

First, we consider whether we might be picking up pre-eminent electoral trends. We run a panel regression, where we evaluate the effect of CAO presence on various elections since 2012 (the Presidential elections of 2012, the European elections of 2014, the Regional elections of 2015, and the Presidential election of 2017), controlling for municipality and election fixed-effects. In Figure A1, where the effect of CAO in the Presidential elections of 2007 is normalized to be zero, the coefficient on CAO is never statistically different from zero except for the 2017 Presidential elections. This evidence shows that treated municipalities were not on different political trends before the election. We focus on the elections since 2012 as other robustness checks and falsification exercises will consider more dated voting outcomes for the FN.

Figure A1: Absence of Pretrends



In Table A1, we regress our main CAO coefficient on past change in vote shares for

the FN in the three Presidential elections using our IV (Columns 1 to 3). We show that our instrument is unrelated to past FN vote evolutions. In columns 4-6, we add different FN voting share trends starting with the difference between 1995 and 2002 up to 2007 and 2012. Our point estimate of the IV coefficient remains significant and of similar magnitude.

Table A1: Pre-Trends: CAO Coefficients on Past Presidential Elections and Controls for Different Front National Trends

	(1) $\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	(2) $\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	(3) $\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	(4) $\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$	(5) $\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$	(6) $\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$
CAO	-0.074	0.097*	-0.094	-0.075**	-0.078**	-0.092**
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F Statistic	107.171	107.163	107.153	107.973	106.806	107.529
Observations	27914	27906	27880	27878	27904	27914
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.173	0.082	0.063	0.064	0.109

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns 1 to 3 are instrumental variables regression lagging the dependent variable in our standard specification by one, then two and then three presidential elections respectively. Column 4 to 6 are instrumental variables regressions controlling first for the evolution of the vote share of the FN between 1995 and 2002, then 2002 and 2007 and then 2007 and 2012 respectively. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

In Table A2, we consider Corsica, which represents an indirect test of our exclusion restriction. No migrants were relocated to Corsica, although it contains many holiday villages. Here, we regress our instrument on voting outcomes for the FN vote in the French Presidential elections. Table A2 shows that no coefficient is significant. These additional regressions underline the validity of our IV approach.

In Table A3, we carry out our main IV regression with Department fixed effects (Column 1), controlling for the FN vote in 2007 in a non-parametric matter (Column 2) and controlling for the FN vote in 2007 up to the third polynomial to make sure some non-linearities or statistical anomalies do not drive our results. Our results remain very similar. In Columns 4-6, we carry out the same exercise for the FN vote in 2012. Our CAO coefficient remains significant, but the effects are stronger, which could be because we control for FN votes in 2012, which is already included in our main outcome.

Table A2: No Link between Holiday Villages and FN trend in Corsica

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}
Holiday village	-0.009	-0.065
	(0.082)	(0.087)
Regression	OLS	OLS
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	352	199
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.188

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns 1 to 2 report the results of OLS regressions of the variation of log FN votes between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 on the dummy for a holiday village. The regression in Column 2 controls for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table A3: Main Results Controlling for Department Fixed Effects and Past Front National Vote

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.138***	-0.118***	-0.109***	-0.233***	-0.228***	-0.236***
	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department fixed effects	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Controls: FN_{2007}	No	Non-parametric	Polynomials	No	No	No
Controls: FN_{2012}	No	No	No	Yes	Non-parametric	Polynomials
F Statistic	171.566	124.250	129.705	127.098	135.224	131.396
Observations	27497	27920	27914	27920	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2	0.128	0.068	0.072	0.141	0.133	0.150

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All columns show the main instrumental variables regression of the log difference in vote shares of the FN on the presence of a CAO. In Column 1 we control for department fixed effects. In Column 2 we control non-parametrically for the FN Vote share in 2007. In Column 3 we control for the log of the FN vote share in 2007 up to the third polynomial. In Column 4 we control for the FN vote share in 2012. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table A4 shows the CAO coefficient of our IV regression considering different sets of control variables. Our control variables are divided into several groupings. One is the infrastructure that should determine or be correlated to hosting a CAO. Here we have the log number of hotel rooms, the share of votes for the FN in 2007, the minimum distance to any other center hosting refugees, the evolution of migrants hosted in CADAs, and whether the municipality had volunteered to receive migrants. In "City characteristics", we include all characteristics, such as population, vacant housing units, population structure, employment structure, unemployment rate, the share of home owners and social housing, the share of immigrants in 2013 and whether the municipality is rural. Δ *City characteristics* represent the evolution of these characteristics between 2006 and 2013. Mayor characteristics are the mayor's political affiliation, age, and main employment. The first column presents the baseline regression in which we control for all the control variables. As we can see from the other columns, even if we exclude the different groups of control variables, we find that the point estimate of the CAO coefficient does not change much in precision nor size.

Table A4: Sensitivity Analysis: Main Results varying the Type of Controls

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.119***	-0.140***	-0.093*	-0.097**	-0.105*	-0.115***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.039)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls: Infrastructure	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: City characteristics	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls: Δ city characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls: Mayor characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
F Statistic	125.371	144.618	103.942	125.490	88.560	119.077
Observations	27920	27920	27920	30052	33248	28127
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.058	0.023	0.053	0.005	0.068

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All columns show the main instrumental variables regression of the log difference in vote shares of the FN on the presence of a CAO. In Column 1 we control for all major groups of controls, which is exactly the baseline specification. In column 2 we do not control for infrastructure in cites related to the hosting of migrants. In column 3 we exclude city characteristics in 2013. In column 4 we exclude the change in city characteristics between 2006 and 2013. In column 5 we exclude both city characteristics in 2013 and its evolution between 2006 and 2013. In Column 6 we exclude characteristics of the Mayor. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.